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Extant literature on personality and crime reveals consistent correlations
between the two (e.g., Agnew et al., 2002; Caspi et al., 1994; Eysenck,
1977, 1996; Jones, Miller, and Lynam, 2012; Miller and Lynam, 2001).
There is also ample evidence that the perceived costs and benefits of
crime, as suggested by rational choice and deterrence theorists, influ-
ence decisions to offend (e.g., Becker, 1968; Cornish and Clarke, 1986;
Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001; Paternoster and Pogarsky, 2009). Both lines
of thought have a restricted focus: one is confined to individual char-
acteristics, whereas the other tends to limit itself to proximal variables
that pertain directly to the crime situation. That is, although person-
ality trait research can identify individual differences in predispositions
to offend, it does little to explain what proximal variables may influ-
ence offending behavior. Conversely, deterrence and rational choice-based
theories can help detect factors that alter the balance in cost–benefit
analyses but generally do not examine individual differences in criminal
propensity.
However, as Nagin and Paternoster (1993) noted, a belief that variation
in offending is reflective of differences in criminal propensity between
individuals does not preclude the possibility that would-be offenders are
also sensitive to the attractions and deterrents of crime. Therefore, in-
stead of being distinctively separate, these perspectives complement each
other and the joint consideration of both perspectives can significantly
enhance our understanding of criminal decision making. In the words of
Miller and Lynam (2001: 781), in order to truly understand relations be-
tween personality and crime, the mechanisms underlying them must be
identified, which requires an examination of the intervening or mediat-
ing processes that connect the distal and the proximal levels. Developing
and testing an integrative model that does so is the goal of the present
study.
Beyond integrating these perspectives in a comprehensive model of crim-
inal decision making, we also extend them separately. We contribute to the
individual differences perspective by using a recent andmore encompassing
structure of personality, the HEXACO model, than models that have been
used in crime research thus far. We extend proximal approaches by adding
feelings, or affect, to the rational choice–crime equation drawing from dual-
process models of information processing.
To denote stable individual dispositions related to offending, we use the
term “traits.” Proximal factors, which operate in the moment of decision
making, are referred to as “states.” Below, we first deal with the trait
component of the model followed by a discussion of the state component.
Subsequently, we discuss their integration and the hypotheses before pre-
senting the results of the study.
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TRAITS: PERSONALITY AND CRIME
Arguably the most important individual-level correlate of delinquent
behavior is self-control. An abundance of research has shown that people
with difficulty controlling their impulses and considering the broader con-
sequences of their actions are more prone to offend than those who do not
(Pratt and Cullen, 2000). Although not rooted in personality psychology,
the self-control concept essentially implies a personality trait as it refers to
stable individual differences in the propensity to act, think, and feel in cer-
tain ways. In the words of Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990: 87), “individual
differences in the tendency to commit criminal acts . . . remain reasonably
stable with change in the social location of individuals and change in their
knowledge of the operation of sanction systems.” Self-control is therefore
“well within the meaning of ‘personality trait’” (Gottfredson and Hirschi,
1990: 109).
The success of the self-control concept in explaining crime and delin-
quent behavior is likely to have overshadowed findings from research
drawing from psychological models of personality, which has established
consistent relations between personality traits other than self-control and
delinquent behavior (e.g., Caspi et al., 1994; Eysenck, 1977, 1996; Miller
and Lynam, 2001; Moffitt et al., 2000; Tellegen, 1985). Indeed, as Caspi et al.
(1994) suggested, crime-proneness is not likely to be defined only by self-
control but instead by multiple psychological components.
models of personality
Although various multidimensional models of personality have been
proposed over the years, there has been increasing agreement among
researchers that a handful of main dimensions, or traits, together cover
the human personality. The so-called Big Five consensus distinguishes the
following traits: Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience,
Agreeableness, and (Emotional Stability versus) Neuroticism (e.g., Costa
andMcCrae, 1990, 1992; Goldberg, 1990;McCrae and Costa, 1990). The Big
Five traits are also represented in, and referred to as, the five-factor model
(FFM) (Costa and McCrae, 1992). Each of the five main traits is, in turn,
made up of lower level factors or “facets.” For example, Conscientiousness,
which refers to the ability to exert self-discipline and control impulses, and
the tendency to think carefully before acting, is composed of facets such as
competence, achievement striving, self-discipline, and deliberation (Costa
and McCrae, 1998). Besides Conscientiousness, the traits Agreeableness,
which regards individuals’ interpersonal relationships and their tendency to
be trusting, straightforward, and empathic, and Neuroticism, which refers
to people’s emotional adjustment and stability, have emerged as consistent
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correlates of antisocial behavior in crime research (Jones, Miller, and
Lynam, 2012; Miller and Lynam, 2001).
Together, the Big Five/FFM personality traits and their constitutive
facets were thought to embody the overarching structure behind all person-
ality traits. However, recent reanalyses of the same data that have led to the
development of the Big Five suggest that there is a sixth main dimension of
personality (Ashton and Lee, 2008; Ashton et al., 2004). The new structure,
the HEXACO model, that emerged from these analyses builds on, and is
in many ways similar to, the Big Five and FFM models, but it extends and
refines them in ways that may be particularly relevant for criminological
research (for an overview of similarities and differences, see Ashton et al.,
2004).
Three of the six HEXACO dimensions, Extraversion, Conscientiousness,
and Openness to Experience, are identical to their equally named Big
Five/FFM counterparts. Two other HEXACO dimensions, Agreeableness
and Emotionality, are modified versions of Big Five/FFM Agreeableness
and Neuroticism. That is, apart from the fearfulness and depression facets,
FFM Neuroticism contains a hostility/anger facet, which, in the HEXACO
model, has shifted to Agreeableness. At the same time, the sentimen-
tality component of Big Five Agreeableness has shifted to HEXACO
Emotionality.
These shifts may explain the paradoxical finding that both high and low
Big Five/FFM Neuroticism have been found to be correlated with crime
(see Miller and Lynam, 2001). The paradox is resolved by the described
shift of facets between the dimensions: When reframed in terms of the
HEXACO model, both low Agreeableness (i.e., high Big Five/FFM Neu-
roticism), through its association with anger and hostility, and low Emo-
tionality (i.e., low Big Five/FFM Neuroticism), through its association with
lack of fearfulness and lack of empathy, are personality traits that may
predispose individuals to different kinds of criminal offenses.
The most significant departure of the HEXACO model from its five-
dimensional predecessors, however, and the most relevant one for crime
research, is the addition of a sixth dimension of personality, Honesty-
Humility (Ashton et al., 2004). This dimension refers to individual differ-
ences in the tendency to be interpersonally genuine, to avoid fraud and
corruption, to be uninterested in status and wealth, to be modest and
unassuming, and the reluctance to take advantage of others to satisfy one’s
own needs (Lee and Ashton, 2004). Individuals scoring low on Honesty-
Humility tend to feel a strong sense of self-importance, are motivated by
material gain, feel tempted to “bend” laws for personal profit, and flatter
others when this is instrumental in the pursuit of their own goals. We argue
that these individuals are more likely to violate rules both because they
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have lower moral standards and because they care less about the well-being
of others who may be affected by their behavior.
Recent empirical research has shown that by virtue of the inclusion of
Honesty-Humility in the HEXACO structure, it outperforms both the FFM
and the Big Five model with respect to several behavioral criteria related
to offending such as psychopathy, Machiavellianism, egoism, immoral-
ity, pretentiousness, unethical decision making, and employee integrity
(Ashton and Lee, 2008; De Vries, Ashton, and Lee, 2009; De Vries and
Van Kampen, 2010; Lee and Ashton, 2005).
Finally, the HEXACO model yields another important advantage over
other models of personality, which is its ability to integrate the psycholog-
ical personality perspective with the criminological self-control paradigm.
Within the HEXACO personality space, self-control can be viewed and
operationalized as an interstitial trait based on a set of facets pertaining
to several of the main dimensions of the model. Essentially, self-control
as defined by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) is a broad dimension of
individual disposition that consists of more specific elements such as self-
centeredness, risk-seeking behavior, and impulsivity. These elements are
also represented as facets in the HEXACO model, and therefore, a self-
control scale can be derived from the model (see the Method section for
further explication).
In other words, the HEXACOmodel offers a broad conceptualization of
personality that encompasses and extends five-factor models in important
ways, but also incorporates self-control. Thus, themodel is able to locate the
latter within the broader personality structure of individuals and integrate
the psychological personality perspective with the most important individ-
ual disposition paradigm in criminology. In sum, we believe the HEXACO
model has much to contribute to crime research and therefore use it as
the operationalization of the trait component of the trait-state model of
criminal decision making. Next we discuss the other constitutive component
of the model, “states.”
STATES: RATIONAL CHOICE AND STATE AFFECT
Rational choice theories posit a reasoning actor who balances costs
against benefits to arrive at a decision. The assumption is that, when faced
with several possible courses of action, people will gravitate toward the
option they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome (Elster, 1989).
According to rational choice theory’s punishment corollary, deterrence the-
ory, people will offend when they perceive the potential benefits to exceed
the anticipated costs and will refrain from doing so when the costs outweigh
the gains. Perceived costs such as the severity and certainty of punishment
are therefore central inputs to the criminal choice calculus. According to
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this perspective, a criminal act essentially implies taking a risk (i.e., making
a decision with an uncertain outcome and a possibility of loss).
Although rational choice and deterrence models tend to be largely cog-
nitive in nature (i.e., based on thinking), various authors have noted that
feelings may also play an important role in decisions to commit a crime
(e.g., Agnew, 1992; Athens, 2005; Katz, 1988; Wright and Decker, 1994,
1997). We argue that adding feelings to the rational choice–crime equation
is likely to generate a more encompassing picture of the criminal decision-
making process, compared with focusing only on cognition or feelings.
One important reason for differentiating between cognitive and affective
(i.e., feeling-based) reactions to risk and criminal decision making is the
different operative logic underlying each. That is, cognitive appraisals and
emotional reactions to risk have different determinants. For example, emo-
tions respond differently to probabilities and outcomes, the two central
input variables of rational choice and deterrence models, than cognitive
evaluations of riskiness (see Loewenstein et al., 2001). As Frijda (1988: 355)
noted, “emotions know no probabilities. They do not weigh likelihoods.
What they know, they know for sure.” In short, because feelings have
determinants that differ from cognitions about a risk, and can therefore cue
different behavioral responses, we believe them to be an important addition
to models of criminal decision making.
In this article, we focus on feelings of fear and insecurity, which we
denote as “negative state affect,” evoked by decision-making situations and
examine these feelings in conjunction with perceived severity and certainty
of punishment to examine how both are related to criminal decisions.
We do so by drawing from so-called dual-process and dual-system models
of information processing (e.g., Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994;
Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Smith and Neumann, 2005; Strack and
Deutsch, 2004; Van Gelder, 2012; Van Gelder et al., 2009). The central
assumption of these models is that there are two separate modes or systems
of mental processing that operate simultaneously when we engage in acts
such as making judgments, considering risky prospects, valuing stimuli, and
processing information. One mode, which we will refer to as the cool mode,
is largely cognitive in nature and based on more deliberate and analytical
considerations. The cool mode, therefore, operates roughly according to the
precepts of rational choice theory (Van Gelder, 2012). The other mode, the
hot mode, relies more on intuitive, automatic, and affect-based processing
(e.g., Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Van Gelder, 2012; Van Gelder et al.,
2009) and has a proper operative logic.1
1. Note that not all dual-process models that have been proposed characterize the
dividing line between the twomodes as one of cognition versus affect. Even though
the models share several characteristics, they differ on other, subtler, points.
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When it comes to evaluating risky prospects, dual-process notions assume
the two modes of processing to respond to different characteristics of a
situation (Kahneman, 2003; Slovic et al., 2002; Van Gelder et al., 2009).
The cool, thinking-based, mode is sensitive to risk considerations such as
probabilities. The hot mode is relatively unresponsive to probabilities of
decision outcomes, but instead it responds to properties of a situation that
play only a minor role in cognitive evaluations, such as the vividness with
which the outcomes can be imagined and their temporal or spatial proximity
(Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2002). Importantly, the hot mode is
tied to the here and now, while the cool mode can also consider the future.
For example, emotions such as fear or anger alert us of imminent threat
and ready us to respond immediately to a situation, whereas cognitions take
delayed consequences into account.
The potential divergence in behavioral responses cued by the hot mode
and the cool mode explains why we can think about something one way
(e.g., “I really shouldn’t do it because it is too risky”) but feel about it
differently (e.g., “I crave it, so I’ll just take my chances”). Precisely because
the way individuals think about a situation may differ from how they
feel about it, as implied by dual-process models, it makes sense to study
cognition and affect in conjunction as proximal predictors of delinquent
behavior.
anticipated versus immediate affect
Even though emotions have occasionally been included in models of
criminal decision making, our approach differs from those taken in pre-
vious studies. When addressing affect, previous research has incorporated
emotions such as anticipated shame and expected guilt (e.g., Grasmick and
Bursik, 1990; Nagin and Paternoster, 1993; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996;
Piquero and Tibbetts, 1996). These anticipated emotions enter the decision
calculus as costs that can be taken into account as such by the decision
maker (Loewenstein et al., 2001). However, the emotions themselves are
expected to be felt only once outcomes have materialized, instead of at the
time of decision. I am, for example, unlikely to feel guilty about or ashamed
of something I have not done (yet). In other words, this type of emotion
essentially regards predictions about future emotional states rather than
emotions experienced at the moment of deciding on a course of action. In
terms of the dual-process approach, the consideration of potential future
regret, guilt, and shame, like estimates of probability and severity, belongs
to the domain of the cool, cognitive, mode as they, at the time of decision,
primarily regard thoughts about feelings instead of feelings themselves.
For example, note the fundamental difference between the following two
considerations that may be relevant when facing a criminal choice: “If I do
this now, I will regret it later” versus “The thought of apprehension scares
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me.” While the regret is expected to materialize after a certain course of
action has been chosen, the fear of apprehension operates in the moment
of decision making. Recall in this respect the difference between the hot
mode that operates in the here-and-now and the cool mode that can also
consider factors that do not pertain to the immediate present.
The immediate visceral reactions to risks and uncertain situations, such as
fear, so-called anticipatory emotions, are experienced at the time of decision
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). Therefore, these emotions imply processing by
the affect-based, hot mode. Although immediate affect includes a wide
range of feelings, such as anger and greed, but also positive affect such
as thrill, excitement, relief, and satisfaction, we limit ourselves to feelings
of fear and anxiety triggered by a decision situation in this article. We
think this is a particularly productive point of departure with respect to
criminal decision making as these feelings form the affective counterpart
of cognitions about risk and deterrence (i.e., the perceived probability and
severity punishment).
INTEGRATING TRAITS AND STATES
The general assumption underlying the proposed model is that taking
into account both individual traits and proximal, state, variables offers a
more complete picture of criminal decision making than looking at either
component in isolation. At the basis of this assumption is the hypothesis
that different aspects of personality are differentially related to the proxi-
mal variables under study. We therefore examine the HEXACO model of
personality as a predictor of criminal choice while simultaneously drawing
from dual-process models by distinguishing perceived risk of sanction from
the state affect evoked by a situation. In this study, we focus on the role
of one specific type of state affect, that is, the negative feelings of fear and
worry evoked by a situation, which is henceforth referred to as “negative
state affect.” We hypothesize that negative state affect and perceived risk
mediate the relationship between personality and criminal choice. The
proposed trait-state model is presented in figure 1.
In line with this reasoning, we believe HEXACO Honesty-Humility,
Emotionality, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Self-Control to be
important predictors of criminal choice. We hypothesize Emotionality to
operate both through negative state affect, that is, feelings of worry and
fear, and through state cognition, that is, perceived risk, in preventing or
provoking criminal decisions. That is, people low in Emotionality tend to be
less fearful in nature, are less anxious about possible consequences of their
actions, and lack feelings of dependence on, and sentimentality toward,
other people. Lack of fearfulness has been shown to be the most important
predictor of thrill and adventure seeking (De Vries, De Vries, and Feij,
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Figure 1. Hypothesized Relations among HEXACO
Agreeableness, Emotionality, Honesty-Humility,
Self-Control, Conscientiousness, Negative State
Affect, Perceived Risk, and Criminal Choice
2009), and it is therefore expected to result in lower levels of negative state
affect in situations that carry risk. At the same time, a lack of anxiety about
the possible consequences of one’s actions is also likely to result in lower
levels of anticipation of the severity and likelihood of the consequences of
criminal actions. That is, to reverse the argument, people high in Emotion-
ality are probably more likely than people low in Emotionality to be able
to imagine what may happen to themselves (anticipated punishment) and
others (anticipated empathy) in case they would opt for the criminal option,
and consequently, they are less inclined to choose it.
In a similar vein, people low on Agreeableness, who are more likely to
experience anger and hostility when feeling “wronged,” are more likely to
have a lower threshold for offending. Their impatience and quick loss of
temper may crowd out feelings of fear and insecurity that may be evoked
by the decision situation, which consequently lose their deterrent potential.
But in contrast to Emotionality, we expect their response to potential crime
situations to be mediated only by negative state affect and not by cognitions
that may temper their impulsive responses. That is, because Agreeableness
has been found to be only weakly (negatively) related to sensation-seeking
and risk-taking behaviors (De Vries, De Vries, and Feij, 2009), we believe
that higher or lower levels of Agreeableness do not make much of a differ-
ence with respect to the levels of anticipated consequences of one’s actions.
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In contrast to Agreeableness, we believe Conscientiousness to operate
mainly through perceived risk. People high in Conscientiousness are more
inclined to assess carefully the consequences of their actions, whereas peo-
ple low on Conscientiousness are less likely to perceive the risks involved
and to evaluate the long-term implications of their actions and are thus
more likely to commit criminal acts. That is, although people low in Con-
scientiousness are more impulsive and disinhibited when it comes to risky
situations (see De Vries, De Vries, and Feij, 2009) and are consequently
less likely to think about the risks associated with theft, embezzlement,
fraud, or other criminal activities, people high on Conscientiousness are
more prudent and more likely to contemplate carefully the long-term
risks associated with these activities, and to consider more extensively the
potentially negative consequences (e.g., fines, social disapproval, jail, and
ostracism) of their actions. Note that the impulsivity implicated in low levels
of Conscientiousness does not signify that people low in Conscientiousness
are often in a “hot” mode. Impulsivity may be unrelated to feelings of fear,
worry, or anger, although the reverse may be true (i.e., that lack of control
over these emotions may cause someone to act impulsively).
Honesty-Humility is expected to operate both directly on criminal de-
cisions, through automatic (learned) behaviors, and indirectly by impact-
ing on both negative state affect and perceived risk. The direct effect of
Honesty-Humility on criminal choices may come about because people low
on Honesty-Humility are more likely to have acquired, from an early age
on, the ability to detect automatically criminal opportunities, such as op-
portunities for theft, and to act on them once they arise. As a consequence,
these behaviors may have become habitual in nature. Honesty-Humility is
also expected to be associated with negative state affect. That is, people high
in Honesty-Humility are more prone to experience negative emotions asso-
ciated with various kinds of criminal activities, as a consequence of which
they are less likely to commit them. At the same time, they are more likely
to think about the possible negative consequences of criminal decisions. In
contrast to Conscientiousness, which regards thinking through the possible
consequences for oneself, people high in Honesty-Humility are also more
likely to consider the consequences of criminal activities for other people
and society as a whole. That is, the contemplated anticipated unfairness and
negative implications, not somuch for themselves, but mainly for others and
for society at large, are more likely to play a more important role for people
high in Honesty-Humility than they do for people low in Honesty-Humility.
Finally, in accordance with the conceptualization of Self-Control as an
interstitial trait that is aligned with Conscientiousness, Honesty-Humility,
and Emotionality, we assume Self-Control to operate both directly and
indirectly, through negative state affect and perceived risk on criminal
choice. That is, people low on Self-Control are more likely 1) to engage
TRAITS AND STATES 647
in impulsive, risky behaviors associated with crime and, as a consequence,
are more prone to habitually commit criminal acts; 2) to have lower levels of
fearfulness, which is characteristic of people who exhibit less negative state
affect; and 3) to have lower levels of prudence and “fair play” attitudes,
which are associated with lower levels of mental activity used for planning
and thinking about the potential costs of criminal decision and hence per-
ceived risk. The hypothesized relations, which were described earlier, are
shown in figure 1 and tested using different scenarios featuring criminal
dilemmas and structural equation modeling (SEM).
METHOD
respondents and procedure
Data were gathered through a large-scale internet panel, set up strictly for
research purposes.2 The panel consists of approximately 20,000 members
and is representative of the Dutch population with respect to gender, age,
education level, and province of residence. To ensure representativeness,
data from Statistics Netherlands are used. Panel members are invited to
complete online surveys various times a year.
Data were gathered over two different waves. In the first wave, a ran-
domly selected subsample of 2,000 Dutch adult (≥18 years) citizens was
drawn from the panel and approached through e-mail. In this wave, which
was conducted in April 2008, HEXACO personality data were gathered. In
the second wave, which was conducted 1.5 years later, in October 2009, data
regarding the state and criminal choice variables were collected.
In the first wave, 68.9 percent of the sample (1,377 respondents;
50.2 percent women) responded to the call. The second wave targeted
the respondents of the first wave of which 52 percent responded to the
call. This sample therefore consisted of 716 Dutch citizens (52.8 percent
women) ranging from 19 to 88 years with a mean age of 50.8 years (standard
deviation [SD] = 14.4 years) who had also participated in the first wave.
We decided to restrict the upper age limit for inclusion to 60 years as we
felt that people beyond this age would be beyond the life stage of those
2. The panel is certified by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
which is a nongovernmental organization that sets worldwide industrial and com-
mercial standards. ISO certification refers to a quality mark that testifies to the
adherence to a set of strict standards and norms for research panels with respect
to the design and execution of research. Panel members are recruited through
send-to-a-friend campaigns among existing panel members, newsletters, and lists
of addresses from third parties taking part in surveys. The panel also grows au-
tonomously by word-of-mouth. In exchange for participation, respondents receive
credits that can be saved and, at a later moment, be exchanged for goods.
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whose criminal decision making is of most interest to criminologists.3 By
restricting ourselves to adult participants up until 60 years old, the second
wave consisted of a final sample of 495 respondents (57.4 percent female) in
the age range of 19–60 years who participated in both waves. The mean age
of the respondents was 43.8 years (SD = 10.6 years), and their educational
levels ranged from primary education (2.2 percent), low-level secondary
education (17.8 percent), high-level secondary education (18.8 percent),
low-level tertiary education (6.1 percent), medium-level tertiary education
(25.9 percent), high-level tertiary education (17.6 percent), to university-
level education (11.7 percent).
To check for sample loss, we compared the original targeted sample with
the final sample on several variables. The results indicate differences be-
tween both samples only with respect to gender; women were significantly
overrepresented in our sample (57.4 percent vs. 50.2 percent in the original
sample, p < .001). No differences in education were found between the two
samples. In terms of province, the breakdown also closely follows that of
the original sample. Finally, no differences were found on the scores on the
HEXACO personality traits between the first wave and the final sample.
scenarios
To test the trait-state model, a scenario design comprising four different
scenarios was developed. The scenarios were presented as “dilemmas” in
a short introduction to the study. Each of the four dilemmas featured a
description (8–12 lines) of a criminal choice situation. Respondents were
asked to imagine that they were in the described situation and to an-
swer several questions pertaining to it. To optimize ecological validity, an
attempt was made to design scenarios that were personally relevant to
the respondents and that described relatively common, everyday criminal
choice situations (e.g., illegal downloading and purchase of stolen goods).
To optimize external validity, multiple scenarios were used. One scenario,
“A new computer,” reads as follows (for the other scenarios, see S.1 in the
online supporting information4):
3. Even though the choice of 60 years is somewhat arbitrary, and an age limit of
around 40 years may seem more appropriate given the decline in offending over
the life course, we found no differences in correlations between the indepen-
dent and dependent variables for these age groups. Furthermore, we deliberately
drafted scenarios that were relevant to both younger and older adults (see the
discussion in the next section).
4. Additional supporting information can be found in the listing for this arti-
cle in the Wiley Online Library at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
crim.2012.50.issue-3/issuetoc.
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Imagine the Following
You need a new computer. One of your colleagues mentioned that he
bought his computer through an acquaintance for a very attractive price,
about 40 percent below the retail value. Your colleague told you that the
acquaintance has more new computers for sale that meet your criteria and
that come in the original packaging. Your colleague also mentioned that
the computers probably “fell off a truck” somewhere, so there is no receipt.
However, you are being assured, in case problems arise with your computer
within two years after purchase, it will be replaced by a new one without
cost so that you do not need to worry about the guarantee.
Buying, possessing, or selling goods of which one knows or could know
that these have been obtained through a criminal act is illegal in the Nether-
lands, and the fine for complicity can be high.
independent variables
Each scenario was followed by items measuring anticipated punishment
probability (henceforth “probability”), anticipated punishment severity
(henceforth “severity”), negative state affect, and the dependent variable
criminal choice. For each construct, we aggregated the responses on all
scenarios to arrive at more reliable and valid measures. We used all scenar-
ios to reduce as much as possible the influence of individual experiences,
feelings, or cognitions vis-a`-vis particular scenarios on the responses pro-
vided. Aggregating the responses on all scenarios reduces error variance
and ensures a more valid estimate of the typical response to a potentially
criminal situation than responses to a single scenario.
Perceived Risk
Perceived Risk is a composite measure of punishment probability times
punishment severity. Two items per scenario, using seven-point scales,
measured punishment probability (e.g., “How likely is it that you will be
caught when you buy the potentially stolen computer?” [very unlikely–
very likely] and “How big do you think is the chance that you will be
found out if you buy the computer of your colleague’s acquaintance?” [very
small–very large]). Rather than experimentally manipulating probability,
respondents were asked to give their own estimate to avoid the artificiality
of furnishing probabilities that respondents could find unrealistic (see Nagin
and Pogarsky, 2001). The same approach was applied to punishment sever-
ity, which was also measured by two items using seven-point scales (e.g.,
“How serious do you consider the possible consequences of being caught
to be?” [not at all serious–very serious] and “How annoying do you find
the potential negative consequences of buying the computer through your
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colleague’s acquaintance?” [not at all annoying–very annoying]). A per-
ceived (sanction) risk measure that reflected both probability and severity
(Probability × Severity) was constructed by multiplying the mean scores of
the probability items with the mean scores of the severity items (see Nagin
and Paternoster, 1993).5 The composite perceived risk measure for the four
different scenarios consisted of eight items (two per scenario) each based
on the Probability × Severity multiplication (multiplying the scores of the
first with the second item, and the third with the fourth item). The scale, for
which scores could range from 1 to 49, had an alpha reliability of .86.
Negative State Affect
Negative State Affect was measured with five items per scenario using
seven-point scales (strongly disagree–strongly agree). The items were pre-
ceded by the sentence: “Imagine you decide to commit/do [the offense]”:
“Would this situation make you feel insecure?” “Do you find the situation
frightening?” “Would you be worried?” “Would you be nervous?” And
“Does the situation evoke negative feelings in general?” (not at all–very
much). A negative state affect scale was computed based on the averaged
responses on the negative affect items of the four scenarios, which resulted
in a score range of 1–7. The scale had an alpha reliability of .96.
HEXACO Personality Inventory
Personality was measured using the 200-item version of the HEXACO
Personality Inventory Revised (Ashton and Lee, 2008; De Vries, Ashton,
and Lee, 2009).6 Each of the six HEXACO dimensions is measured by 32
items, eight per facet, on five-point (strongly disagree–strongly agree) scales.
One interstitial facet represents Altruism. In previous studies, principal
component analysis (PCA) on the 24 facets representing the six dimensions
revealed six main factors with eigenvalue > 1, a clear break of eigenvalues
after the sixth factor, and highest loading of the facets on their intended
factors (De Vries, Ashton, and Lee, 2009; Lee and Ashton, 2004).7 The
5. As an alternative measure of perceived risk, we also computed a variable based
on the mean scores of the probability and the severity items and correlated this
summeasure and the original multiplicative measure with the other variables. The
patterns are nearly identical for both measures with the multiplicative measure
doing slightly better. We therefore retained the multiplicative measure for the
analyses.
6. The 100-item version of the HEXACO Personality Inventory can be freely ob-
tained (for research purposes) from www.hexaco.org. For information on the 200-
item version, please contact the authors.
7. Because five items of the Fairness facet of the Honesty-Humility dimension were
tautological in nature, for the purposes of the present research (i.e., showed
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HEXACO-PI-R factor scales are computed on the basis of the averaged
item scores and hence have a range of 1–5. All alpha reliabilities of the
factor scales exceeded .84, and none of the absolute correlations between
the factor scales exceeded .28.
HEXACO Self-Control
According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), self-control is a broad
individual disposition that contains impulsivity, lack of diligence and per-
sistence, preference for physical (as opposed to cognitive) activities, risk-
seeking, self-centeredness, and low frustration tolerance. This conceptual-
ization lies at the basis of the self-control scale developed by Grasmick et al.
(1993), which is the most commonly used operationalization of the concept
in crime research. In this study, we will follow this conceptualization of
self-control and operationalize it as an interstitial trait in the HEXACO
personality space based on various facets of different main dimensions of
the HEXACO model.8
This is done following the approach suggested by DeVries, De Vries, and
Feij (2009), which consists of three steps. First, we selected the HEXACO
facets that correlated most strongly with the Grasmick et al. (1993) Self-
Control scale. Second, we ran regressions using these facets with Grasmick
et al. (1993) Self-Control as a dependent variable. Third, we simplified
the regression to the following formula in which multiplication terms were
assigned to the facets on the basis of the value of the standardized regres-
sion coefficients of each facet: HEXACO Self-Control = (3 × Prudence +
2 × (Fairness + Modesty + Fearfulness + Flexibility) + (Social Self-
esteem + Patience + Inquisitiveness + Diligence + Altruism))/16. That
is, HEXACO Self-Control is interstitial in the six-dimensional personality
sphere consisting of the Conscientiousness facet Prudence, the Honesty-
Humility facets Fairness and Modesty, the Emotionality facet Fearfulness,
the Agreeableness facet Flexibility, and to a lesser extent the Extraversion
facet Social Self-esteem, the Agreeableness facet Patience, the Openness
to Experience facet Inquisitiveness, the Conscientiousness facet Diligence,
and the interstitial facet Altruism. The final HEXACO Self-Control scale,
predictor-criterion overlap [e.g., “I would never accept a bribe, even if it were
very large”]), these items were omitted from the analyses.
8. The reason for basing the analyses on the HEXACO Self-Control operational-
ization instead of the Grasmick et al. (1993) scale, beyond demonstrating how
self-control can be incorporated within the HEXACO personality sphere, is that
when tested simultaneously in a regression analysis, the HEXACO Self-Control
measure turned out be a better predictor of criminal choice (β = .23, p < .01) than
the Grasmick measure (β = .12, p = .03), R2 = .10, F(1, 492) = 27.68, p < .001.
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used in this study, correlated .61 (p<.01) with the original Grasmick et al.
(1993) Self-Control scale.
dependent variable
Criminal Choice
The dependent variable, Criminal Choice, was measured with three
items. Two items inquired about the likelihood that the respondent would
choose the criminal option. In one of these items, respondents were asked
to give a percentage estimate of this likelihood. The other item also in-
quired about likelihood, but it used a seven-point scale (e.g., “How likely
is it that you would decide to buy the computer of your colleague’s ac-
quaintance” [very unlikely–very likely]). The third item measured the de-
gree of certainty of the criminal choice (i.e., “How certain are you about
this?” [not at all–completely]). The seven-point likelihood item was recoded
to a scale that ranged from –3 to +3, and a criminal choice score was
computed by multiplying the recoded likelihood item with the certainty
item, so that the scores could range from –21 to +21. Together with the
percentage estimate item, this recoding resulted in a composite criminal
choice measure based on eight items (two per scenario) with a reliability
of .96.
RESULTS
To test the trait-state model, we first computed the bivariate correlations
between the HEXACO personality dimensions, Negative State Affect and
Perceived Risk, and the dependent variable Criminal Choice for the com-
bined score of the four scenarios (table 1). Honesty-Humility, Agreeable-
ness, Conscientiousness, and Self-Control were significantly correlated with
Criminal Choice. No significant correlations between Emotionality, Open-
ness to Experience, and Extraversion on the one hand and Criminal Choice
on the other were found. Both Perceived Risk (i.e., Probability × Severity)
and Negative State Affect were strongly related to Criminal Choice.9 Fur-
thermore, Honesty-Humility, Agreeableness, Emotionality and Extraver-
sion, and HEXACO Self-Control were all significantly correlated with both
Perceived Risk and Negative State Affect. Conscientiousness was related
only to Perceived Risk.
Subsequently, we tested our prediction that Negative State Affect and
Perceived Risk mediated the relations between personality and Criminal
9. For each scenario, there were also significant correlations (p < .01) among an-
ticipated punishment probability, anticipated punishment severity, and criminal
choice.
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Table 1. Correlations of HEXACO-PI-R Scales, HEXACO
Self-Control, Perceived Risk, Negative State Affect,
and Criminal Choice
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Mean 3.80 3.14 3.35 3.05 3.44 3.21 3.42 34.06 4.66 19.66
Standard Deviation .49 .47 .47 .44 .40 .47 .27 20.08 1.36 9.22
1. Honesty-Humility — — — — — — — — — —
2. Emotionality .13∗∗ — — — — — — — — —
3. Extraversion −.04 −.28∗∗ — — — — — — — —
4. Agreeableness .28∗∗ −.15∗∗ .12∗∗ — — — — — — —
5. Conscientiousness .08 −.03 .18∗∗ .05 — — — — — —
6. Openness to
Experience
−.10∗ −.17∗∗ .24∗∗ .06 .08 — — — — —
7. HEXACO
Self-Control
.63∗∗ .13∗∗ .13∗∗ .58∗∗ .45∗∗ .07 — — — —
8. Perceived Risk .26∗∗ .21∗∗ −.09∗ .12∗∗ .16∗∗ −.04 .24∗∗ — — —
9. Negative State
Affect
.31∗∗ .35∗∗ −.18∗∗ .09∗ .03 −.03 .28∗∗ .66∗∗ — —
10. Criminal Choice −.29∗∗ −.06 .03 −.17∗∗ −.10∗ −.04−.24∗∗ −.52∗∗ −.58∗∗ —
NOTE: N = 495.
∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01.
Choice. This prediction was tested over two separate models using SEM
in AMOS (SPSS Corporation, Chicago, IL; Arbuckle, 2007). In the first
SEM, we included the main HEXACO dimensions as trait variables but
not HEXACO Self-Control. In the second model, we included HEXACO
Self-Control but omitted the main HEXACO dimensions. The reason for
testing the predictions over separate models instead of combining them into
one model is that if tested simultaneously, the overlap in facets between
HEXACO Self-Control and the other HEXACO dimensions would distort
the relationships between the variables in the model.
We decided to use latent variables in the SEMs to obtain better (e.g.,
disattenuated) estimates of the model’s path coefficients. For each latent
variable, two parallel parcels were constructed that were used as manifest
indicators. For the HEXACO variables, we included items of the half-
length (100-item; see De Vries, Ashton, and Lee, 2009) version of the
HEXACO variables into one parcel, and the remaining items into another
parcel. Similarly, for the proximal variables and Criminal Choice, we in-
cluded half the items from the different scenarios into one parcel and the
remaining items into a second parcel.
The decision in favor of the “two parallel parcels” approach instead of us-
ing individual items as manifest variables or—in the case of the HEXACO
personality scales—as personality facets was based on several reasons. First,
items are known to contain unique variance and spurious cross-loadings,
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which is parceled out when combining them, thus ensuring more reliable
indicators of a latent construct and a better approximation of normality
in continuous distributed variables. Additionally, using items in models
increases their complexity manifold and raises the number of degrees of
freedom relative to the sample N, leading to poorer model fit (Bentler
and Chou, 1987; Hagtvet and Nasser, 2004). Second, as a result of their
interstitial nature, the use of personality facets often leads to the occurrence
of cross-loadings, which also results in poor model fit (Ashton et al., 2009).
The procedure adopted in this study prevents cross-loadings and offers a
parsimonious way of testing the effects of personality on the other vari-
ables compared with models in which all the personality dimensions are
represented by the original items or facets.
To model the two-way relation between Negative State Affect and Per-
ceived Risk, we decided to allow the errors (ζ ’s) of the two proximal
variables to covary. Furthermore, we also allowed the error terms of the
Criminal Choice variable to covary. Given the fact that the wording of
two of the original items was very similar and referred to the likelihood
of making a criminal choice, it was proper to include this error covariance.
Finally, because no single measure identifies a correct model given the
sample data, it is good practice to report various fit indices of structural and
measurement models (e.g., Gibbs, Giever, and Higgins, 2003; Hoyle and
Panter, 1995; Hu and Bentler, 1999; Schumacker and Lomax, 2004). For
the comparative fit index (CFI), the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), and the
Tucker–Lewis index (TLI), values close to .95 indicate a good fit (Hu and
Bentler, 1999; Schumacker and Lomax, 2004). For the root-mean-square
error of approximation (RMSEA), values equal to or smaller than .05
indicate a good fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999).
model 1: main HEXACO dimensions, negative state affect, perceived
risk, and criminal choice
In model 1, we included the HEXACO trait variables Honesty-Humility,
Emotionality, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness; the mediating proxi-
mal variables Negative State Affect and Perceived Risk; and the outcome
variable Criminal Choice on the basis of the hypothesized relationships (see
figure 1). The model, which was based on the product moment correlation
matrix and maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, had an adequate fit:
χ2(d.f. = 63) = 128.50, p < .01; CFI = .95, GFI = .96, TLI = .92, and
RMSEA = .05. However, even though this model had a satisfactory fit, the
standardized path coefficient from Agreeableness to Negative State Affect
was not significant (γ = .02 and p = .88). We therefore decided to remove
this path from the model. Note that by removing this path, Agreeableness
TRAITS AND STATES 655
was completely removed from the model. The final model, containing the
standardized path coefficients of the main latent and observed (i.e., man-
ifest) variables and the errors and covariances, is shown in figure 2. The
ellipses in figure 2 represent the latent variables, whereas the rectangles
represent the observed variables. This final model also had an adequate fit
(χ2(d.f. = 43) = 100.70, p < .01; CFI = .95, GFI = .97, TLI = .92, and
RMSEA = .05) and provided the most parsimonious representation of the
relations between Criminal Choice and both the trait and state variables.
As shown in table 2 (for the same model with gender and age added as
control variables, see S.2 in the online supporting information), the main
determinants of Criminal Choice were (in order of predictive importance)
Negative State Affect, Perceived Risk, Honesty-Humility, and Emotional-
ity. Honesty-Humility and Emotionality were both directly and indirectly,
via Negative State Affect and Perceived Risk, related to Criminal Choice.
That is, Honesty-Humility and Emotionality were positively related to both
Negative State Affect and Perceived Risk, which in turn were negatively re-
lated to Criminal Choice. However, while Honesty-Humility had a negative
direct effect on Criminal Choice, this effect was positive for Emotionality.
Conscientiousness was only (positively) related to Perceived Risk.
The indirect effects from the personality traits to the outcome variable
Criminal Choice were all significant (see table 2). In other words, the effects
of Honesty-Humility and Emotionality operated both through Negative
State Affect and Perceived Risk and directly on Criminal Choice. Con-
scientiousness, however, was only indirectly related to Criminal Choice as
its effect operated via Perceived Risk. Note the negative indirect effect
of Emotionality on Criminal Choice that is countered by a positive direct
effect, which leads to a total effect that is near zero.
The (total) indirect effects do not speak to whether the effect be-
tween a trait and the outcome variable is mediated by either Negative
State Affect or Perceived Risk or by both state variables. To test our
mediation hypotheses (i.e., to examine whether the specific indirect ef-
fects between the traits Honesty-Humility and Emotionality and Crimi-
nal Choice are significant), we use the distribution of products approach
(MacKinnon et al., 2002). This approach involves the conversion of the pa-
rameter estimates that comprise a mediation relation (e.g., from Honesty-
Humility to Negative State Affect, and from Negative State Affect to
Criminal Choice) into z scores by dividing each unstandardized parameter
estimate by its standard error and multiplying the resulting two z scores
(zαzβ) and by using a critical value based on the distribution of the product
of random variables to determine significance. We find that both state
variables are statistically significant mediators of the relation between both
Honesty-Humility and Emotionality and Criminal Choice (p < .001).
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Table 2. Unstandardized and standardized path coefficients
and significance levels for Model in Figure 2
Unstandardized
Coefficients Standardized
Estimates (S.E.) Coefficients p
Measurement Model
Emotionality—emo1 1.51 (.05) 1.00 .00
Emotionality—emo2 1.00 — .84 .00
Honesty-Humility—hones1 1.10 (.09) .88 .00
Honesty-Humility—hones2 1.00 — .91 .00
Conscientiousness—consc1 .84 (.03) .80 .00
Conscientiousness—consc2 1.00 — 1.00 .00
Negative State Affect—nsa1 1.00 — .98 .00
Negative State Affect—nsa2 .96 (.02) .97 .00
Perceived Risk—pr1 1.00 — .91 .00
Perceived Risk—pr2 1.15 (.04) .97 .00
Criminal Choice—CC1 1.00 — .68 .00
Criminal Choice—CC2 2.06 (.15) .53 .00
Structural Model (Direct Effects)
Emotionality → Negative State Affect 1.23 (.18) .31 .00
Emotionality → Perceived Risk 4.29 (1.12) .18 .00
Emotionality → Criminal Choice 2.15 (.94) .13 .02
Honesty-Humility → Negative State Affect .93 (.15) .29 .00
Honesty-Humility → Perceived Risk 5.01 (.96) .26 .00
Honesty-Humility → Criminal Choice −2.74 (.80) −.20 .00
Conscientiousness → Perceived Risk 2.83 (.73) .14 .00
Negative State Affect → Criminal Choice −2.88 (.33) −.67 .00
Perceived Risk → Criminal Choice −.24 (.05) −.33 .00
Negative State Affect → Perceived Risk 5.91 (.55) .64 .00
Structural Model (Indirect Effects)
Emotionality → Criminal Choice −4.55 (.77) −.27 .00
Honesty-Humility → Criminal Choice −3.86 (.72) −.28 .00
Conscientiousness → Criminal Choice −.67 (.26) −.05 .00
Structural Model (Total Effects)
Emotionality → Criminal Choice −2.39 (1.21) −.14 .04
Honesty-Humility → Criminal Choice −6.59 (1.36) −.49 .00
Conscientiousness → Criminal Choice −.67 (.26) −.05 .00
NOTES: χ2(d.f. = 43) = 100.70, p < .01; CFI = .95, GFI = .97, TLI = .92, and RMSEA = .05.
N = 495.
ABBREVIATIONS: CFI = comparative fit index; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; RMSEA =
root-mean-square error of approximation; SE = standard error; TLI = Tucker–Lewis index.
In sum, not only do Honesty-Humility and Emotionality directly affect
criminal choice, but they also lead to higher levels of Negative State Affect
and higher Perceived Risk, both of which, in turn, are negatively related
to Criminal Choice. Conscientiousness, however, only influences criminal
choices indirectly through Perceived Risk. Higher levels of Conscientious-
ness lead to higher Perceived Risk, which in turn leads to less criminal
choice.
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Table 3. Unstandardized and standardized path coefficients
and significance levels for Model in Figure 3
Unstandardized Standardized
Estimates Coefficients (S.E.) Coefficients p
Measurement Model
Self-Control—HEXSC1 1.23 (.12) .96 .00
Self-Control—HEXSC2 1.00 — .81 .00
Negative State Affect—nsa1 1.00 — .97 .00
Negative State Affect—nsa2 .97 (.02) .98 .00
Perceived Risk—pr1 .86 (.03) .90 .00
Perceived Risk—pr2 1.00 — .98 .00
Criminal Choice—CC1 1.00 — .65 .00
Criminal Choice—CC2 2.08 (.15) .51 .00
Structural Model (Direct Effects)
Self-Control → Negative State Affect 1.87 (.27) .32 .00
Self-Control → Perceived Risk 10.88 (1.94) .26 .00
Self-Control → Criminal Choice −4.40 (1.41) −.18 .00
Negative State Affect → Criminal Choice −2.88 (.32) −.68 .00
Perceived Risk → Criminal Choice −.18 (.05) −.31 .00
Negative State Affect → Perceived Risk 7.71 (.67) .65 .00
Structural Model (Indirect Effect)
Self-Control → Criminal Choice −7.39 (1.28) −.30 .00
Structural Model (Total Effect)
Self-Control → Criminal Choice −11.79 (1.94) −.48 .00
NOTES: χ2(d.f. = 14) = 38.20, p < .01; CFI = .99, GFI = .98, TLI = .99, NFI = .99, and
RMSEA = .06. N = 495.
ABBREVIATIONS: CFI = comparative fit index; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; NFI =
Normed Fit Index; RMSEA= root-mean-square error of approximation; SE= standard error;
TLI = Tucker–Lewis index.
model 2: HEXACO self-control, negative state affect, perceived risk,
and criminal choice
In model 2, we included HEXACO Self-Control as a trait predictor
together with the states Perceived Risk and Negative State Affect as medi-
ators of the relation between HEXACO Self-Control and Criminal Choice
(figure 3). We employed an analysis strategy analogous to the one used for
the previous model, again basing the SEM model on the product moment
correlation matrix and using ML estimation. This model showed a very
good fit: (χ2(d.f. = 14) = 38.20, p < .01; CFI = .99, GFI = .98, TLI = .99,
and RMSEA = .06).
The results in table 3 indicate that Self-Control is both directly and indi-
rectly related to Criminal Choice (for the same model with gender and age
added as control variables, see S.3 in the online supporting information).
Again, by using the method proposed by MacKinnon et al. (2002) based on
the product of coefficients (zαzβ) as a test for significance of the specific
indirect effects, we find that both state variables are statistically signifi-
cant mediators of the relation between Self-Control and Criminal Choice
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(p < .001). In sum, having more Self-Control leads to higher Perceived
Risk and to more experienced Negative State Affect, which in turn are
negatively related to Criminal Choice. Furthermore, there is also a direct
negative effect of Self-Control on Criminal Choice.
As a final step in the analyses, we compared a model with HEXACO
Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Conscientiousness, and HEXACO Self-
Control (model 1) with a model with the three main dimensions but without
Self-Control (model 2) and a model with only HEXACO Self-Control
(model 3) to examine the parsimony of both the HEXACO model with-
out Self-Control and the Self-Control model without the other HEXACO
variables. Because HEXACO Self-Control is made up of facets of the other
main dimensions, we included four error covariances between HEXACO
Self-Control and the other manifest variables in the SEM. In model 2,
we set all path coefficients linking Self-Control to the mediators and the
outcome variable to zero. In model 3, we did the same for the other HEX-
ACO variables while freeing up the path coefficients from HEXACO Self-
Control. Subsequently, we compared the fit of the three models (model 1:
χ2(d.f. = 56) = 123.16, p < .01; CFI = .95, GFI = .96, TLI = .92, and
RMSEA = .05; model 2: χ2(d.f. = 59) = 131.18, p < .01; CFI = .95, GFI=
.96, TLI = .92, and RMSEA = .05; model 3: χ2(d.f. = 63) = 188.21, p <
.01; CFI = .91, GFI = .95, TLI = .87, and RMSEA = .06). The difference
between model 1 and model 2 was just significant (χ2(d.f. = 3) = 8.02
and p = .05), indicating that the HEXACO model without Self-Control
bordered on being better than a model with Self-Control. However, the
Self-Control model without the other HEXACO variables was significantly
worse than a model that included the HEXACO variables (χ2(d.f. =
7)= 65.05 and p < .01). Additionally, the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC), which takes into account the parsimony of the model, was lower
in model 2 (BIC = 416.59) than in model 3 (BIC = 448.80), showing that
the HEXACO model without Self-Control had a better relative fit than a
comparable model with Self-Control but without the other three HEXACO
variables.
DISCUSSION
As in previous studies that have examined the relation between individ-
ual dispositions and delinquent behavior (see Miller and Lynam, 2001), we
found Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Self-Control to be correlated
with criminal choice. Furthermore, the Honesty-Humility dimension of the
HEXACO model, which is not represented in other models of personality,
turned out to be the strongest personality correlate of criminal choice.
Honesty-Humility, it will be recalled, refers to individual differences in
the proactive willingness to use others for personal gain and includes
TRAITS AND STATES 661
self-enhancing and immoral behaviors, such as greed and immodesty and
active violations of social norms through insincerity and unfairness. This
finding ties in with research that links morality (i.e., reflections of what
is right and wrong with respect to values and conduct [e.g., Wikstro¨m,
2004]) and egoism (i.e., the excessive concern with one’s own pleasure
or advantage at the expense of community well-being [De Vries, Ashton,
and Lee, 2009; De Vries et al., 2009; Weigel, Hessing, and Elffers, 1999])
to criminal behavior. However, Honesty-Humility carries the advantage
over these other measures in that it is integrated in a broader structure
of personality, instead of being an isolated trait. This provides insight into
how it is related to personality in general, which implies greater precision
in terms of the psychological processes at stake compared with isolated
measures.
A similar point can be made regarding the HEXACO operationalization
of Self-Control. An important strength of the HEXACO model is that it
offers a broad conceptualization of personality that encompasses both the
Big Five/FFM dimensions and Self-Control and locates the latter within
the broader personality space. Although it has been shown previously that
the main crime-related element of Self-Control is primarily associated with
Big Five/FFM Conscientiousness (Romero et al., 2003), common opera-
tionalizations of Self-Control in crime research suggest that it is actually an
interstitial trait based mainly on facets from Honesty-Humility, Conscien-
tiousness, and Agreeableness (cf. De Vries, De Vries, and Feij, 2009 – see
also the correlations in table 1 of HEXACO Self-Control with the other
HEXACO scales). The results of the present study support this broader
notion of Self-Control and as such contribute to our understanding of the
precise nature of this concept.
We hypothesized perceived risk of sanction and negative affect to me-
diate the personality–crime relation drawing from dual-process models
of information processing. Indeed, both variables were found to mediate
the effects of the personality dimensions Emotionality, Honesty-Humility,
and Self-Control on criminal choice. Individuals scoring high on Honesty-
Humility were both more inclined to feel negatively about the conse-
quences of a criminal choice and to perceive risk of sanction as higher
than low scorers. The same effect was found for Emotionality. For Self-
Control too, high scorers reported higher levels of negative affect and
perceived a higher risk of sanction. In terms of the dual-process model
discussed at the beginning of this article, this means that Honesty-Humility,
Emotionality, and Self-Control operate both through the hot mode and the
cool mode of information processing. For Conscientiousness, only the per-
ceived risk of sanction mediated the relation with criminal choice. Note that
although Conscientiousness was only indirectly related to criminal choice,
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Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, and Self-Control also operated directly
on it.
One remarkable finding with respect to Emotionality should be noted. As
hypothesized, we found an indirect negative effect of Emotionality on crim-
inal choice. However, the direct effect of Emotionality on criminal choice
was positive in nature. Although caution is advised when interpreting the
positive effect, we speculate that people scoring high on Emotionality
(i.e., who exhibit a greater tendency to be worried, fearful, sentimental,
and dependent) may – out of fear of criminal-minded others or to please
them – in some instances be more likely to engage in certain types of illegal
behavior.
It could be argued that the high correlation between perceived risk
and negative state affect suggests that these are highly similar constructs.
Note, however, that there are differences in the extent to which personality
explains both and in the extent to which criminal choice is explained by
each. These differences underscore our argument regarding the fact that
these are different variables and the necessity of differentiating between the
two in models of criminal decision making (see for an extensive discussion,
Van Gelder, 2012). The stronger relation between negative state affect
and criminal choice compared with perceived risk of sanction suggests
that the former may more often cue the ultimate behavioral response in
a criminogenic situation than the latter.
It is interesting to note that these effects were found using scenarios
describing criminogenic situations that actually invite deliberation and the
making of cost–benefit assessments (e.g., insurance fraud and illegal down-
loading). Future studies should address situations where this is less likely
or evident and in which divergence between emotional appraisals and cog-
nitive risk assessments is more plausible and larger. It seems, for example,
likely that impulsive “hot” crimes (i.e., crimes associated with a high level of
affective arousal, such as certain sexual offenses [e.g., date rape], violence-
related offenses [e.g., road rage and retaliation], hot-blooded murders [e.g.,
crimes of passion], and offenses committed by craving drug addicts [e.g.,
street robbery]) make poor candidates for deterrence precisely because
they require individuals to take into consideration the long-term conse-
quences of their actions, whereas intense emotional states, drugs, and sexual
arousal all operate to confine attention to the immediate present. In each
of these situations, the immediate benefits and long-terms costs of behavior
are negatively correlated and the benefits appeal to and work on feelings
(e.g., sexual gratification and quenching a thirst for revenge), whereas the
consideration of the potential costs of rule violation is a cognitive exercise
for the most part. For example, Wright and Decker in their study on
burglars and street life write:
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[T]he offenders, at the time of actually contemplating offenses, typ-
ically perceived themselves to be in a situation of immediate need
[which] has at least two important implications. First, it suggests a mind-
set in which they were seeking less to maximize their gains than to
deal with a present crisis. Second, it indicates an element of despera-
tion which might have weakened the influence of threatened sanctions
and neutralized any misgivings about the morality of breaking into
dwellings (1994: 61).
Conversely, crimes committed in an emotionally neutral state belong to
the domain of rational, cold, processing and should be, we believe, more
susceptible to be influenced by anticipated sanctions.
One advantage of an approach, such as the hot/cool approach advocated
in this study, that can examine the influence of feelings alongside rational
and cognitive considerations is its ability to shed light on what specific
delinquent behaviors can be deterred by altering the balance in the cost–
benefit equation of such behaviors, and what kinds of behavior are less
susceptible to such influence. For crimes that are intimately related to
feelings, impacting the cost–benefit calculus is unlikely to generate much
effect as affect, which implicates hot processing, is relatively irresponsive to
rational and cognitive considerations such as punishment probability and
severity.
Examined in conjunction with a structural model of personality, such
as the HEXACO model, it becomes clear that questions regarding what
aspects of personality are particularly susceptible to what type of influ-
ence, and what aspects are not, can be addressed. For example, individuals
dispositionally low in Emotionality are unlikely to be deterred by simply
increasing the severity of a sanction or its probability. For these individuals,
behavioral interventions that also aim to sensitize them to experiencing
negative affect and the risks associated with their unlawful actions may
form a productive complementary strategy. A similar point can be made for
Honesty-Humility and Self-Control, which operate both indirectly and di-
rectly on criminal choice. Furthermore, if Honesty-Humility is themain cor-
relate, interventions should also be aimed at instilling (moral) awareness,
promoting greed avoidant behaviors, and diminishing self-centeredness.
For Conscientiousness, something else seems to apply: As willful offenders,
individuals low in Conscientiousness may be sensitive only to sanction
severity and probability.
In criminology, trait and state factors have generally been examined in
isolation. Most situational, or state, perspectives, such as rational choice
theory, routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson, 2002),
deterrence, and situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1997), are based
on behavioral models that posit a rational offender and generally do not
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address offender characteristics or affect, let alone scrutinize the ways in
which they may be interrelated. A similar point can be made about theories
that look at individual differences; only rarely do proximal factors receive
extensive treatment in these perspectives. Yet, as was remarked at the be-
ginning of the article, the fact that there may be stable differences between
individuals in terms of their criminal propensity does not exclude the possi-
bility that potential offenders are insensitive to the perceived attractions
and deterrents of crime (Nagin and Paternoster, 1993). Furthermore, it
is unlikely that situational factors exert the same influence on individuals
regardless of their psychological makeup. In other words, instead of being
incompatible, trait and state perspectives are actually complementary, and
therefore, the two need to be integrated into models that attempt to explain
crime. Previous models (e.g., Nagin and Paternoster, 1993; Piquero and
Tibbetts, 1996) focusing on differences in individual disposition in com-
bination with proximal states were generally restricted to rational choice
variables and self-control. The trait-state model presented and tested in
this article broadens our current knowledge by using a new encompassing
model of personality, the HEXACO model, and by including state affect
next to rational choice considerations as predictors of crime.
Having said that, we consider this article to be only an initial step in
the development of a comprehensive trait-state model of criminal decision
making. As such, the study was also prone to several limitations that should
be kept in mind when considering the results. First, we opted for a sce-
nario method as this allowed us to link personality to state variables and
intentions to offend in a single model. We recognize that a weakness of
this method is that it measures behavioral intentions rather than actual
behavior. However, provided certain conditions are observed, there is a
high correlation between a person’s intention to perform a behavior and
his or her actual performance of that behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975;
see also Nagin and Paternoster, 1993). These conditions are the degree to
which the intention to behave is measured with the same specificity as the
behavior that is being predicted, the stability of the expressed intention,
and the degree to which the individual can willfully carry out the intention
(Nagin and Paternoster, 1993: 473–4). The scenarios we developed for this
study were developed with these criteria in mind. Another limitation of
this study is that the research population consisted of a community sample,
instead of an offender population, which implied that the scenarios were
not about severe antisocial behavior, but about relatively common everyday
crimes instead. This poses limits on the generalizability of the results, such
as how personality plays out in the case of persistent offenders. As a
next step, it would be productive to test the model among an offender
population instead of among a community sample, and for offenses more
serious than the ones used in this study. Determining whether the structural
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properties and correlates of the variables used are similar in offender
and community samples can shed light on whether similar or dissimilar
psychological processes are at play in these different populations (Rucˇevic´,
2010). Furthermore, this study addressed a prevalent and important type
of affect with respect to criminal decision making (i.e., feelings of fear and
insecurity triggered by the decision situation) but not other types of affect
that are also likely to play a role such as excitement, thrills, and anger. The
correlations among personality, affect, and crime will depend on the type of
affect under study. Therefore, to generate a more encompassing view of the
role of feelings on criminal decision making, future research should address
other types of affect.
To conclude, we concur with Miller and Lynam (2001) that more speci-
ficity in the outcome variable is also warranted in future research on the
personality–crime relationship, which should examine what particular as-
pects of personality are more strongly related to what specific type of crime.
For example, even though some authors have contended that a lack of self-
control is equally related to virtually all types of crime (Gottfredson and
Hirschi, 1990), and that beyond self-control few dimensions of personality
are useful in the explanation of crime (Hirschi, 2004), it is not unlikely that
Honesty-Humility is more strongly correlated with those types of crime
in which financial self-enhancement plays a role, such as fraud and white-
collar crimes, whereas self-control is a more important correlate of crimes
in which impulsivity and intense emotions are at stake.
Furthermore, disentangling the different elements of self-control implies
that future research can obtain a better grasp of what specific aspects are
related to which specific types of crime and at what point during the life-
cycle certain aspects bear stronger relations than others (see also Jones,
Miller, and Lynam, 2012). The use of different traits in an encompassing
model of personality instead of one unitary personality concept opens up
the possibility of differentially predicting specific types of offenses, some-
thing that the single self-control concept has been unable to do. Estab-
lishing meaningful relationships between specific traits and specific types
of offenses could, besides providing important theoretical input, also imply
an important step forward in the treatment of offenders. Exploring these
questions in more detail, we think, will make for a productive line of future
empirical inquiry and a welcome step in the further development of trait-
state models of criminal decision making.
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